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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy has been a neglected area of the law in the United
States and other countries.' The need to further develop international
bankruptcy law has become more urgent as the volume of international
business increases.2 Today, when a multinational company files for
bankruptcy, it may have to adhere to the conflicting insolvency laws of
numerous countries.3 Such a conflict of laws may have an adverse im-
pact on the liquidation or reorganization of a company.4 More impor-
tant, inconsistencies in international insolvencies create uncertainty and
instability in international transactions.' The difficulties resulting from
cross-border insolvencies cause problems for consumers, investors and
governments,6 and have spurred lawyers, accountants, and administra-
tors to encourage increased cross-border cooperation.1
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1. See Morales and Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and United States
Recognition of Foreign Insolvencies: The Tyranny of Conity, 39 Bros. LAW. 1573.
1574 (1984) (arguing that the only common principle linking United States bankruptcy
decisions is the doctrine of comity of nations). For purposes of this Comment, the term
"bankruptcy" will refer to bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, and reorganization.
2. See Mears, Cross-Border Insolvencies in the 21st Century: A Proposal for Inter-
national Cooperation, 1 INT'L INSOL. R. 23, 24-25 (1991) (explaining that as interna-
tional business increases, so must the need for international insolvency provisions).
3. Id. The conflicting laws prevent the equitable distribution of assets in one pro-
ceeding. Id. at 25.
4. Id. Ms. Mears claims that such conflicting laws may lead to "economic and legal
chaos for creditors, debtors, and such innocent third parties as consumers, investors and
governments."Id. For a demonstration of the extent to which bankruptcy laws of vari-
ous countries conflict, see INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES (Git-
lin and Mears eds. 1989) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AD BANK-
RUPTCIES] (detailing current bankruptcy law in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Eg)pt,
England, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands. Sitzerland,
the United States, and Venezuela).
5. Mears, supra note 2, at 25. In particular, uncertainty and lack of predictability
adversely affect global lending transactions. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Ms. Mears argues that lawyers, accountants, and administrators have taken
the lead in fostering international cooperation because of the failure of multinationals.
lenders, and governments to advocate international insolvency cooperation. Id.
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Recognizing the complicated problems associated with multinational
bankruptcies, Committee J of the International Bar Association formed
a group to analyze the present state of international insolvency cooper-
ation.8  The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act
(MIICA),9 created and drafted by members of Committee J, is a pro-
posal for domestic legislation for adoption by individual countries.10
While some legislators, scholars, and bankruptcy practitioners advocate
alternate methods for international insolvency cooperation," MIICA
offers the most realistic solution for the immediate future.
Part I of this Comment discusses the problems the United States and
other countries face in international bankruptcy law. Part II explains
MIICA's development and how MIICA proposes to solve modern
problems. Part III surveys how the United States and other major in-
dustrialized nations must modify existing bankruptcy laws. Part IV
analyzes alternate proposals for international cooperation in light of the
MIICA draft. Part V recommends strategies for MIICA's enactment
worldwide, with specific focus on domestic legislation in the United
States. Finally, Part VI explains why MIICA presents the best alterna-
tive for the achievement of international consistency in cross-border
insolvencies.
8. Id. at 28. Subcommittee J is called the Subcommittee on International Coopera-
tion and is presently headed by Timothy E Powers. Id. at 29. Ms. Mears is a member
of the Subcommittee on International Cooperation and has significantly contributed to
the drafting and revision of MIICA. Id.
9. COMM. J, SEC. ON Bus. L., INT'L BAR ASS'N, MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOL-
VENCY COOPERATION ACT (Third Draft, Nov. 1, 1988) reprinted in Barrett and Pow-
ers, Proposal for Consultative Draft of Model International Insolvency Cooperation
Act for Adoption by Domestic Legislation With or Without Modification, INT'L Bus.
LAW. 323-27 (July-August 1989) [hereinafter MIICA].
10. Mears, supra note 2, at 27-28. The proposal strives to provide a reciprocal and
unified method for handling cross-border insolvencies. Id.
I1. See, e.g., Draft, Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Com-
positions and Similar Proceedings, 1980, reprinted in 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
6111 (1981) [hereinafter EEC Draft Convention) (proposing a draft treaty for the
European Economic Community); Draft of United States of America-Canada Bank-
ruptcy Treaty, October 29, 1979 [hereinafter United States-Canada Draft Treaty], re-
printed in J. DALHUISEN, 2 DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANK-
RUPTCY (1981) (advocating United States-Canadian cooperation in cross-border
insolvencies); Scandinavian Convention, November 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S. 136 (memo-
rializing an agreement of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden); Busta-
mente Code of Private International Law, February 2, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. 362 (includ-
ing a chapter on bankruptcy signed by fifteen Latin American countries).
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I. CURRENT UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Currently, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Bankruptcy
Code") governs United States bankruptcy law. 2 A debtor usually ob-
tains bankruptcy relief either through Chapter 7,13 Chapter 11,14 or
Chapter 1315 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy
Code provides for the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee in all Chap-
ter 716 and Chapter 1317 cases, and in some Chapter I 1 cases as well.' 8
Either an individual or a corporation 9 can act as a bankruptcy trustee,
functioning as the representative of the debtor's estate with the ability
to sue and be sued.20
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, United States law orders
the payment preferences and priorities to creditors to achieve the equi-
table distribution of the debtor's estate.21 This standard hierarchy may
be altered subsequently by the adjudicating court. 22 The different prior-
ity levels are established according to the types of claims asserted by
creditors.23 The general classes of claims include secured claims, prior-
ity unsecured claims, nonpriority unsecured claims, and equity inter-
ests.2 4 The claims are disbursed according to the class to which they
12. I1 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 (1988). The Bankruptcy Reform Act governs almost all
bankruptcy cases because it applies to cases filed after October I, 1979. Id.
13. Id. §§ 701-766 (1988) (entitled Liquidation). In Chapter 7 cases, the debtor
gives all non-exempt property owned at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition
to the bankruptcy trustee hoping to receive a discharge from any personal liability. See
Id. § 704 (describing the duties of the bankruptcy trustee).
14. Id. §§ 1101-74 (1988) (entitled Reorganization). Chapter il deals with the
rehabilitation of the debtor's assets. Id. Although Chapter II relief is available to all
debtors, any reorganization scheme must follow certain guidelines. Id. § 1123.
15. Id. §§ 1301-30 (1988) (entitled Adjustment of Debts of an Individual With
Regular Income). Chapter 13, like Chapter 11, offers relief in the form of reorganiza-
tion, but requires that the debtor be an individual with a regular income. Id.
16. Id. §§ 701-704 (1988).
17. Id. § 1302 (1988). Chapter 13 provides for appointment of a trustee if the
court so orders. Id.
18. Id. § 1104.
19. Id. § 321.
20. Id. § 323.
21. Melnick, International Bar Association Committee on International Creditors'
Rights, Insolvency, Liquidation and Reorganization (Committee J), Priorities and Pref-
erences Under United States Bankruptcy Law, I (Oct. 1989) (on file at the offices of
The American University Journal of International Law & Policy), REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. H.R. Doc. No. 137.
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 213 (1983).
22. Melnick, supra note 21.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. A creditor holds a secured claim when he or she has a valid security interest
in property of the debtor's estate or when he or she has a right to set off prepetition
1991]
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belong. 28 Classification of the claim dictates treatment of the creditor
and often changes in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings. As a
result, creditors must assert their rightful and most beneficial place in
line at the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding and must re-
main attentive throughout the proceeding to retain that status."
B. FULL PROCEEDINGS
In asserting jurisdiction over a bankruptcy proceeding, a court exam-
ines the debtor's domicile, principal place of business, or the presence
of property within the jurisdiction.17 A bankruptcy proceeding com-
mences through the filing of either a voluntary or involuntary peti-
tion.28 A person domiciled in the United States, a person whose princi-
pal place of business is in the United States, or a person who owns
property in the United States may file a voluntary petition.29 It is possi-
claims (derived from common law, statute, or contract) against mutual prepetition
debts owed to the debtor. Id. at 3.
Priority unsecured claims, in descending order, include: administration claims; gap
creditor claims; employee and wage claims; fisherman and grain producer claims; con-
sumer claims; and tax, duty, and penalty claims, Id. at 6-12. Nonpriority unsecured
claims which are timely filed are entitled to proceeds from the estate after senior credi-
tors are paid. Id. at 13.
Equity interests are subordinate to all classes of claims and may receive little or
nothing in a liquidation. Id. at 30. Holders of equity interests thus have the most to
gain from the reorganization rather than liquidation of the insolvent estate. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L LAW.
1153, 1153-54 (1985) (citing J. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOL-
VENCY AND BANKRUPTCY, §§ 2.04 [1] and [2], at 3-229 (1981)). If jurisdiction is
based on the presence of property, the in rem proceeding can only affect the property
located in that jurisdiction. Id. at 1154. This rule respects the principle that adjudica-
tion in one country may not affect property in another country. Honsberger, Conflict of
Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 631, 639
(1980).
28. See generally The United States Working Group, Committee J, International
Bar Association, Amendments to United States Bankruptcy Law Required to Incorpo-
rate the Model International Insolvency Act (MIICA) Approved by the International
Bar Association and Strategies for Achieving Enactment, 1 (Oct. 4, 1989) (on file at
the offices of The American University Journal of International Law and Policy) [here-
inafter U.S. Working Group] (describing present United States bankruptcy law).
29. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(a) and 301 (1988). Section 109(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a person that resides or
has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, or a munici-
pality, may be a debtor under this title.
Id. § 109(a). Section 301 provides:
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a
debtor under such chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a
chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.
Id. § 301.
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ble to file an involuntary petition against a domestic or foreign entity if
that entity qualifies as a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. 30 The
Bankruptcy Code also allows the foreign representative of an estate in
a foreign proceeding to file an involuntary petition against a person.31
The filing of either a voluntary or involuntary petition in the United
States imposes restrictions on and grants rights to a foreign debtor or
creditor. 32
C. ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS
United States bankruptcy law also provides for the filing of suits
auxiliary to the principal proceeding33 and the opportunity for a foreign
representative to make a limited appearance in a United States court.3
30. Id. § 303. To qualify as a debtor, a foreign entity must meet the requirements
of section 109(a). Id. Section 303(a) of Title II provides:
An involuntary case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or II of this title,
and only against a person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that
is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, that may be a debtor
under the chapter under which such case is commenced.
Id.
31. Id. § 303(b)(4). This section provides:
An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bank-
ruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 1I of this title-by a foreign repre-
sentative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning such person.
Id.
32. U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 5. Asserting jurisdiction over the bank-
ruptcy proceeding empowers a court to strive for deference to foreign proceedings and
foreign law while preserving basic United States bankruptcy principles. Id.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988). Section 304(b) states that in granting ancillary relief,
a court may:
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against-
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign pro-
ceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to
such property, or any act or the commencement or continuation or any
judicial proceeding to create or enforce a lien against the property of such
estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such prop-
erty, to such foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
Id. § 304(b).
An ancillary proceeding does not commence a full bankruptcy case, but may be used
"to administer assets located in this country, to prevent dismemberment by local credi-
tors of assets located here, or for other appropriate relief." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 324-25 (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]- S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
34. 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1988). This provision permits a foreign representative to ap-
pear in a United States court without being subjected to the jurisdiction of any court in
the United States. The purpose is to prevent local creditors from obtaining an unfair
1991]
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The Bankruptcy Code offers ancillary relief based upon the discretion
of the presiding judge.3 5 In determining what relief to grant a party
commencing a case ancillary to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, the
court must consider:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate; (2)
protection of claimholders in the United States against prejudice and inconve-
nience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; (3) prevention of
preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate; (4) distribution
of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed
by [the Bankruptcy Code]; (5) comity;38 and (6) if appropriate, the availability
of a fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceeding concernsA
7
This provision of the Bankruptcy Code strives to defer to foreign pro-
ceedings and further the general bankruptcy goal of equitable adjudi-
cation of the debtor's assets.38
advantage over the foreign representative. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 325-26;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 36. The bankruptcy court may, however, condition
relief to the foreign representative on compliance with the orders of the bankruptcy
court. U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 4.
35. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 324-25; SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at
35. See also U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 4 (stating that an ancillary pro-
ceeding is not a full bankruptcy case and so does not create rights to property within
the United States).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988). See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)
(noting that comity has been defined as "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of the laws."); see also Clark-
son v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976) (asserting that New York courts
construe the doctrine of comity especially narrowly when a foreign jurisdiction also
applies common law similar to United States law); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
Inc. v. A.W. Galardi and A.W. Galardi Commodities, 610 F. Supp. 114, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that international comity dictated recognition of Dubai
bankruptcy proceedings because they were consistent with American principles); Leo-
nard, Carfagnini and McLaren, Can There Be International Co-operation in Foreign
Bankruptcies? A Canadian Examination of Some Alternative Models, 3 REv. INT'L
Bus. L. 23, 28 (1989) (explaining that despite the absence of international agreements
in insolvency proceedings, comity serves as a basis for recognizing foreign bankruptcy
proceedings).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988). These guidelines are designed to give the courts
maximum flexibility in handling ancillary cases. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at
324-25; SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 35. Principles of international comity and
respect for the judgments and laws of other nations suggest that courts should issue
orders that consider all of the circumstances of each case rather than respect inflexible
rules. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 33, at 324-25; SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at
35.
38. U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 5.
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D. EVALUATION OF CURRENT UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW
Commentators have both widely acclaimed and criticized United
States treatment of foreign proceedings. 31 On one hand, the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 197840 mandates greater recognition of foreign
proceedings when those foreign proceedings facilitate the administra-
tion of the debtor's estate.4 The Bankruptcy Reform Act initiated in-
creased international cooperation in the bankruptcy realm, resulting in
increased stability in international markets."2 On the other hand,
American and foreign bankruptcy practitioners have criticized the
Bankruptcy Code for its failure to address the issue of which substan-
tive law to apply when determining whether to grant ancillary relief.4 3
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code formally binds only bankruptcy
courts and has no authority over non-bankruptcy courts, many of which
routinely face decisions involving the recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings.4
Other questions raised under the Bankruptcy Code involve whether a
foreign debtor ineligible for relief under section 109(b)" may be the
subject of a section 304 proceeding; whether a foreign debtor must
39. See, e.g., Morales and Deutcsh, supra note 1, at 1573-74 (arguing that Con-
gress, by enacting section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, provided a forum and standards
for resolution of international commercial disputes); Unger, supra note 27, at 1153
(describing the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 as reflective of a more generous attitude
toward claims of foreign creditors); Gitlin and Flaschen, The International Void in the
Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307, 317-18 (1987) (detailing the
flaws of section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code).
40. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
41. Unger, supra note 27, at 1155-56.
42. Id. at 1183.
43. U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 5.
44. See Unger, supra note 27, at 1178 (claiming that although non-bankruptcy
courts have applied the doctrine of comity more leniently, they still are not bound by
the Bankruptcy Code).
45. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 317-18. Section 109(b) of the United
States Bankruptcy Code provides:
(b) A person may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title only if such person is
not-
(1) a railroad;
(2) a domestic insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank,
savings and loan association, building and loan association, homestead as-
sociation, credit union, or industrial bank or similar institution which is an
insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act; or
(3) a foreign insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank,
savings and loan association, building and loan association, homestead as-
sociation, or credit union, engaged in such business in the United States.
11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1988).
1991]
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have assets in the United States to qualify for section 304 relief;4"
whether a foreign representative in a section 304 case can utilize the
avoidance powers provided in the Code;47 whether domestic assets
should first be used to satisfy domestic claims; 48 and how to achieve
uniformity in the courts' treatment of attachment liens secured by do-
mestic creditors prior to commencement of United States proceed-
ings.49 Some courts have interpreted section 304(c) of the Code as a set
of prerequisites for granting relief, rather than as a flexible standard.eo
Critics oppose using section 304(c) as a rigid standard because this
favors United States creditors over foreign creditors. 1
United States case law concerning multinational bankruptcies re-
flects these problems. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978,52 courts often issued inconsistent decisions that were hos-
tile to foreign representatives.53 An incident commonly called the "Her-
46. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 317-18. Although section 304 does not
specifically address the question, the court in Metzeler v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 78
Bankr. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), granted section 304 relief to recover United States prop-
erty when the United States was not the foreign debtor's domicile, place of business, or
the location of the debtor's tangible property. Id.
47. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 317-18. Section 926 of Title II provides
for the appointment of a trustee to pursue an action under an avoiding power. II
U.S.C. § 926 (1988). The Senate Report explains section 926 as follows:
This section is necessary because a municipality might, by reason of political
pressure or desire for future good relations with a particular creditor or class of
creditors, make payments to such creditors in the days preceding the petition to
the detriment of all other creditors.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 33, at 111.
48. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 317-18.
49. Id.
50. Leonard, Carfagnini and McLaren, supra note 36, at 29. See II U.S.C. §
304(c)(4) (1988) (stating that the distribution of proceeds be "substantially in accord"
with United States Bankruptcy law).
51. Leonard, Carfagnini and McLaren, supra note 36, at 31.
52. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
53. In Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809), the Supreme Court held
that the assets held in the United States by a joint American-British partnership would
be adjudicated according to United States laws. Id. at 302. The Court based its deci-
sion on the premise that "the bankrupt[cy] law of a foreign country is incapable of
operating a legal transfer of property in the United States." Id. The Supreme Court, in
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), held that a French judgment would not be
enforced in the United States because of the "want of reciprocity, on the part of
France, as to the effect to be given to the judgments of this and other foreign coun-
tries." Id. at 210. But see Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908) (rul-
ing that a German judgment should be recognized provided that local citizens' interests
and public policy concerns are retained without compromise); Canada S. R.R. v. Geb-
hard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883) (holding that reorganization schemes in other countries
should be recognized because of the doctrine of international comity).
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statt Affair" 5' vividly illustrates the inability of United States bank-
ruptcy courts to efficiently and predictably manage international
insolvencies.
When a German company that used Chase Manhattan Bank as a
clearinghouse declared bankruptcy in Germany, Chase immediately
froze the company's United States assets.85 A race to file proceedings
in courts of various countries ensued.8 6 Unsure of its rights with regard
to the German bankruptcy, Chase filed an interpleader action in New
York." ' The Cologne liquidator of the estate never appeared in a
United States court for fear of subjecting himself to the full jurisdic-
tion of the United States court system.8 Unsure of the outcome of a
potentially lengthy adjudication, the parties agreed to reach an out of
court settlement.59 The parties' preference for settlement over court ad-
judication illustrates the failure of international law to manage compli-
cated multinational bankruptcy cases.60
After the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,01 court
decisions became less hostile to foreign proceedings.6 2 The main advan-
tage to increased United States cooperation with ongoing proceedings
in a foreign court is that it encourages the reciprocal cooperation of
those countries in future cases. 63 United States enactment of section
304 of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrates this cooperative effort." The
case of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. A. IV. Galardi & A. W.
Galardi Commodities further demonstrates the trend toward greater
54. See Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons
Taught By Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1977) (discussing the "Her-
statt Affair"); Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.AJ.
1290 (1976) (describing the "Herstatt Affair" in detail).
55. Unger, supra note 27, at 1164-65.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598. 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of I1 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); see Nadclmann, A
Reflection on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction News From the European Common Market.
the United States and Canada, 27 McGILL L.J. 541. 544-48 (1982) (discussing the
development of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
62. Powers and Mears, Protecting a U.S. Debtor's Assets in International Bank-
ruptcy: A Survey and Proposal For Reciprocity, 10 N.C.J. lN'"L L. & COmmI. REG.
303, 344-45 (1985).
63. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 323.
64. Id. The authors claim that despite the problems posed by section 304, it demon-
strates an American desire to aid foreign nations in administering their bankruptcies.
Id.
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings.6 5 In Drexel, a United
States district court deferred to proceedings in Dubai on the basis that,
although different from United States law, Dubai bankruptcy law was
not inconsistent with United States principles and therefore should be
recognized." The Drexel result is particularly significant because it re-
flects a new willingness on the part of United States courts to recognize
even those foreign proceedings unfavorable to United States creditors.67
E. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY
LAW
American inconsistency in dealing with foreign insolvencies results
from the absence of a clear policy regarding international cooperation.
While increased United States recognition of foreign proceedings pro-
motes reciprocity by other nations, enhances efficient use of resources,
and avoids multiplicity, non-recognition protects local creditors, avoids
inconvenience to United States claimholders and prevents application
of unfair foreign standards. 8 Advocates of the "universality theory"
65. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. A.W. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). See Kenner Prods. v. Soci6t6 Fonci6re et Financi~re Agache-Willot,
532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting a motion to transfer the case to the
court's suspense docket pending termination of bankruptcy proceedings in France);
Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. 49 Bankr. 614 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 773
F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985) (deferring to a foreign proceeding when no American interest
was implicated in the dispute); In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (grant-
ing transfer of assets to a district within the Bahamas for foreign adjudication of inter-
ests of American creditors); In re Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S.A., 10 Bankr. 790(S.D. Fla. 1981) (releasing United States held assets of a Nicaraguan airline to a Nic-
araguan bankruptcy proceeding subject to the condition that claims of United States
creditors be satisfied first). But see International Corp. v. Karlander Kangaroo Line,
Pty. Ltd., 102 Bankr. 373 (D.N.J. 1988) (denying a foreign representative's petition
for ancillary relief under section 304 on the basis that the laws and public policy of the
United States would be violated if the United States court deferred to Australian bank-
ruptcy law); In re Toga Mfg., 28 Bankr. 165 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (denying relief to a
Canadian trustee because the Canadian Bankruptcy Act provides for a different order
of priority than does the United States).
66. Drexel, 610 F. Supp. at 119. In Drexel, an American plaintiff argued that he
should be able to seek relief in the United States court system because he would not be
granted full relief under Dubai law. Id. at 116. The court held that unless the Dubai
proceedings were fraudulent or fundamentally unfair, they were entitled to deference
from American courts. Id.
67. Unger, supra note 27, at 1183. Furthermore, Drexel marked the first time a
United States court granted relief to a foreign trustee from a non-sister common lawjurisdiction. Id. Accord The Clarkson Co. ex rel. Newfoundland Refining Co. v.
Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976) (concluing that a Canadian trustee could pro-
cure records from a Canadian corporation's New York office because comity dictated
that United States courts recognize foreign proceedings, especially in a sister common
law jurisdiction such as Canada).
68. Unger, supra note 27, at 1160.
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emphasize the beneficial aspects of international cooperation.6" The
universality theory dictates that the court in which the bankruptcy suit
is pending has exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor's assets, re-
gardless of where these assets are situated.70 As a result, all creditors
must argue their claims in the original bankruptcy court."'
Other commentators focus on the disadvantages of universality and
adhere to the alternate theory of "territoriality." 7' According to the
territoriality theory, a multinational corporation could be subject to
proceedings in different states with each state applying its own laws. 3
These competing theories 4 form the basis of modern obstacles to inter-
national cooperation in bankruptcy law.7 5 Rather than committing it-
self fully to one particular approach, the United States utilizes an
amalgamation of the two theories.7 6 Whenever a foreign court claims
the United States assets of a debtor, the United States typically advo-
cates universality in theory yet actually practices territoriality, thus
producing inconsistent and often conflicting court decisions."
69. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 309; Powers and Mears, supra note 62,
at 305-06.
70. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 309.
71. Id.; Powers and Mears, supra note 62, at 305-06; see Unger, supra note 27, at
1154 (stating that the debtor's assets are controlled by the trustee and all creditors
must go to that jurisdiction to enforce claims).
72. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 309; Powers and Mears, supra note 62,
at 306.
73. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 309; see Unger, supra note 27, at 1155
(explaining that no extraterritorial recognition is given to proceedings taking place in
other states).
74. See Powers and Mears, supra note 62, at 305 (discussing the theories of univer-
sality and territoriality).
75. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 309.
76. Unger, supra note 27, at 1155. Unger postulates that subsections one, three,
and four of section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrate a tendency toward univer-
sality, while subsections two and five reflect a territorial approach. Id. at 1172-73.
77. Powers and Mears, supra note 62 at 309; see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1894)(recognizing the doctrine of comity but denying the enforcement of a Frenchjudgment because of the lack of reciprocity demonstrated by French courts); Harrison
v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809)(denying recognition of British claims on the
basis that the operation of a foreign jurisdiction's laws cannot legally transfer property
located in the United States); In re Toga Mfg., 28 Bankr. 165 (E.D. Mich. 1983)(find-
ing that comity did not require recognition of Canadian bankruptcy law because there
was no strict mutuality); In re Stoddard and Norsk Lloyd Ins. Co., 242 N.Y. 148. 151
N.E. 159 (1926) (granting claims under United States policies issued by agents of the
insurance company located in New York, but refusing to grant claims under United
States policies issued by agents of the company outside the United States).
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II. THE MODEL INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
COOPERATION ACT
A. DEVELOPMENT
Recognizing the problems caused by the lack of bankruptcy coopera-
tion among nations, Committee J of the International Bar Association
inquired into how the members could advocate a universality ap-
proach.7 8 The members of Committee J concluded that worldwide en-
actment of domestic legislation encouraging international cooperation
would successfully address the deficiency.79 The focus in the interna-
tional arena shifted from competing rights of states to a realization
that the international character of modern business transactions com-
pelled efficient adjudications benefitting both creditors and debtors.80
When members of Committee J of the International Bar Association
proposed section 304 of the United States Code as a model for interna-
tional legislation, other countries objected. Other countries argued that
although the aims of section 304 were praiseworthy, its results did not
meet cooperation expectations. 81 The resulting proposal aims to pre-
serve local bankruptcy court jurisdiction, assuming such jurisdiction
supports certain general bankruptcy principles."2 These principles in-
clude: (1) stay or dismissal of local proceedings; (2) production of
records and access to testimony; (3) turnover of assets; (4) recognition
and enforcement of judgments and orders; (5) recognition of a repre-
sentative of the debtor's estate; (6) flexibility in procedures; and (7)
consideration for local policies and laws within a reciprocal duty to
cooperate.8 3
B. PROVISIONS
Committee J presented the Model International Insolvency Coopera-
tion Act with the goal of achieving universality.8 4 MIICA addresses
78. Leonard, Carfagnini and McLaren, supra note 36, at 39-40.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 42.
81. Id. In particular, countries have rejected section 304 as an international alter-
native because it affords the presiding judge considerable discretion and thus creates
uncertainty in the international community. Id. at 23.
82. Id. at 40.
83. Mears, supra note 2, at 27.
84. MIICA, supra note 9, at 324 (Official Comment, Statement of General Princi-
ples). The MIICA Statement of General Principles explains:
The ultimate goal of model legislation for international insolvency cooperation is
universality which envisions a single administration providing protection of the
insolvent debtor's estate from dismemberment, and an equitable distribution of
assets among both domestic and foreign creditors in liquidation, or the equitable
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three major topics: (1) the duties of a local court to assist in foreign
proceedings; (2) the procedures for providing such assistance; and (3) a
treaty override provision. 5 Section one of MIICA 0 requires courts to
recognize foreign representatives, to aid foreign proceedings in coun-
tries that afford substantially similar treatment for foreign insolvencies,
and to aid foreign proceedings in any country if the jurisdiction is
proper and convenient or serves the best interests of the creditors and
debtor."'
Section two8 of MIICA allows a foreign representative to seek relief
ancillary to a foreign proceeding in the form of a turnover of assets, a
administration of the estate in a reorganization, composition or rehabilitation
proceeding. Insofar as possible, such universality should be the guiding principle
of all efforts toward international insolvency cooperation, for it alone is truly
compatible with the realization of equal treatment of all creditors, debtors, assets
and liabilities, and the swift and effective administration of the estate. Within
the parameters of this overarching principle, mechanisms must be provided for
the recognition of foreign representatives, the stay of local proceedings, the pro-
duction of documents and testimony, the integration of asset distribution and
other forms of ancillary relief. In a world of increasing global integration and
growth of true multinational business entities, these principles are the indispensa-
ble elements in attaining equity and fairness in international insolvency
proceedings.
Id.
85. Mears, supra note 2, at 30. A clear summary and description of the MIICA
provisions can be found at Leonard, Carfagnini and McLaren, supra note 36, at 40.
86. MIICA, supra note 9, § 1, at 323. Section one provides:
In all matters of insolvency, including bankruptcy, liquidation, composition, reor-
ganization or comparable matters, a Court, in accordance with the provisions of
this Act,
(a) shall recognize a foreign representative of the debtor or estate, pro-
vided that such foreign representative complies with the orders of such
Court;
(b) shall act in aid of and be auxiliary to foreign proceedings pending in
the courts of all countries that provide substantially similar treatment for
foreign insolvencies as that provided by this Act; and
(c) shall act in aid of and be auxiliary to foreign proceedings pending in
the courts of all other countries, if the Court is satisfied that:
(i) the court or administrative agency having jurisdiction over the
foreign representative is a proper and convenient forum to supervise
administration of the property of the debtor; and
(ii) the administration of the property of the debtor in the pertinentjurisdiction by the foreign representative is in the overall interests of
the creditors of the debtor.
Id. § 1, at 323-24.
87. Id. The sources for section one include English case law, U.S. Bankruptcy Code§§ 304(a) and 306, the Australian Bankruptcy Act, and two not yet enacted Canadian
bankruptcy bills. MIICA, supra note 9, § 1, at 324 (Official Comment, Sources).
88. Id. § 2, at 324. Section two provides:
(a) A foreign representative may commence a case ancillary to a foreign pro-
ceeding by a petition under this Act for purposes of:
(i) obtaining an order to turn over to the foreign representative any prop-
erty of the debtor or the estate in this jurisdiction;
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stay or dismissal of a proceeding in the jurisdiction, discovery regarding
the insolvency, recognition and enforcement of a foreign order, or any
other "appropriate relief."'18  Section two further provides that a court
shall consolidate any ancillary case with pending related insolvency
proceedings in that jurisdiction."' Finally, section two affords flexibility
in the type of relief granted to the foreign representative and empha-
sizes the fact that an ancillary proceeding should aid the overall admin-
istration of the estate in the dominant jurisdiction.9 1
Although MIICA is premised on the central administration of the
debtor's estate, it does provide for commencement of a full proceeding
by a foreign representative in section three.9 2 A foreign representative
may petition the court for a full proceeding if ancillary relief is un-
available or if the court denies such relief.93 The court will grant a full
proceeding only if the foreign representative has already pursued and
been denied ancillary relief.94
(ii) staying or dismissing any action or proceeding concerning the debtor
or estate in this jurisdiction;
(iii) obtaining testimony or production of books, records or other docu-
ments relating to an insolvency;
(iv) obtaining recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or court
order; or
(v) obtaining any other appropriate relief.
The Court may exercise such additional powers with respect to the matter as it
could exercise if the matter had arisen within its own jurisdiction.
(b) Upon the commencement of an ancillary case, any currently pending related
insolvency proceeding in this jurisdiction shall be consolidated with such ancil-
lary case.
id.
89. Id. The form and concept of section two is derived from section 304 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 2, at 325 (Official Comment, Sources). The
specific types of relief presented in section two, however, are based on the Special Pro-
ject on International Cooperation and Bankruptcy Proceedings of the International Bar
Association Committee J (1987), the proposed Canadian Bill, the Federal Statute on
Private International Law of Switzerland, and the Switzerland Commentary on the
Special Project on International Cooperation and Bankruptcy Proceedings, of the Inter-
national Bar Association Committee J (1987). Id.
90. Id. § 2(b), at 324. This is to ensure that all proceedings will be "in aid of and
auxiliary to" the dominant foreign proceeding. Mears, supra note 2, at 32.
91. MIICA, supra note 9, § 2, at 325 (Official Comment, Explanation).
92. Id. § 3, at 324. Section three provides:
In the event that ancillary proceedings pursuant to Section 2 are unavailable or
denied, a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning a
person, may commence an insolvency proceeding against such person in this ju-
risdiction in accordance with the provisions of the applicable laws of this
jurisdiction.
Id.
Section three is derived from section 303(b)(4) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
Id. § 3, at 326 (Official Comment, Sources).
93. Id. § 3, at 324.
94. Id. § 3, at 326 (Official Comment, Explanation).
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In section four,9 5 MIICA provides that while the substantive law of
the foreign court that has jurisdiction over the principal proceeding
governs ancillary proceedings, the substantive law of the local jurisdic-
tion may supersede if private international law or conflict of laws rules
so dictate.96 Furthermore, if the foreign representative is granted a full
proceeding under section three of MIICA, section four stipulates that
local substantive law may then apply.9 7 Section five98 allows a foreign
representative the opportunity to make a limited appearance in court to
seek ancillary relief without subjecting herself to the full jurisdiction of
the court. 9 Once the ancillary proceeding commences, however, the
foreign representative is subject to counterclaims and cross-claims
within the court's jurisdiction. 100 This provision not only encourages ef-
ficient administration of the estate, but also reassures the foreign repre-
sentative that she will be treated fairly.
101
95. Id. § 4, at 324. Section four provides:
(a) In any case commenced ancillary to a foreign proceeding as provided in Sec-
tion 2, a Court shall apply the substantive insolvency law of the foreign court
having jurisdiction over the foreign proceeding, unless after giving due considera-
tion to principles of private international law and conflict of laws, the Court de-
termines that it must apply the substantive insolvency law of this jurisdiction.
(b) A Court shall apply the substantive insolvency law of this jurisdiction in any
insolvency proceeding brought by a foreign representative as provided in Section
3.
Id.
96. Id. § 4(a), at 324. Presumably, the procedural aspects of such a case are gov-
erned by local law. Id. § 4, at 326 (Official Comment, Explanation). Section 4(a)
originates from the English Commentary to the Special Project on International Coop-
eration and Bankruptcy Proceedings of the International Bar Association Committee J.
Id. § 4, at 326 (Official Comment, Sources).
97. Id. § 4(b), at 324. Section 4(b) articulates "the generally accepted principle of
utilizing local substantive law when the benefits of a full local proceeding are sought by
the person initiating the proceeding." Id. § 4, at 326 (Official Comment, Sources).
98. Id. § 5, at 324. Section five provides that "[ain appearance in a Court by a
foreign representative in connection with a petition or request under this Act does not
submit such foreign representative to the jurisdiction of any Court in this jurisdiction
for any other purpose." Id.
99. Id. Section five is primarily based upon section 306 of the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code. Id. § 5, at 326 (Official Comment, Sources).
100. Id. § 5, at 326 (Official Comment, Explanation).
101. Id. The drafters explained:
The intention of the model act is not only to provide access to the Court for the
foreign representative, but to provide an efficient, equitable and safe mechanism
for the foreign representative to use, in order to encourage a central administra-
tion of the estate and to foster the principle of universality.
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Section six of MIICA 02 clearly defines "foreign representative" and
"foreign proceeding." 103 Section seven10 4 provides that any treaty or
convention agreed to by two or more countries supersedes the provi-
sions of MIICA.' 5 This section responds to concerns that MIICA
might impede the progress of treaties and conventions currently under
consideration in various countries.106
C. PROBLEMS
Although MIICA solves many of the current problems involving
multinational bankruptcies, it raises new problems of its own. First, it
remains unclear whether the ancillary proceeding approach is available
or even possible to enact in all foreign jurisdictions. 10 7 Second, jurisdic-
tions may favor local creditors over foreign representatives because of
political pressure to protect local interests. 08 Third, MIICA may not
be sufficiently jurisdiction-neutral, particularly because it closely re-
sembles the United States Bankruptcy Code." 9 Fourth, whereas
MIICA stipulates that the law of the principal forum is to be applied,
102. Id. § 6, at 324.
103. Id. § 6, at 326 (Official Comment, Purposes). Section six provides:
(a) "Foreign representative" means a person who, irrespective of designation, is
assigned under the laws of a country outside of this jurisdiction to perform func-
tions in connection with a foreign proceeding that are equivalent to those per-
formed by a trustee, liquidator, administrator, sequestrator, receiver, receiver-
manager or other representative of a debtor or an estate of a debtor in this
jurisdiction.
(b)"Foreign proceeding" means an insolvency proceeding, whether judicial or ad-
ministrative, in a foreign country, provided that the foreign court or administra-
tive agency conducting the proceeding has proper jurisdiction over the debtor
and its estate."
Id. § 6, at 324.
The definitions are expansive enough to encompass the different types of proceedings
and different roles of representatives of various countries. Id. § 6, at 326 (Official Com-
ment, Purposes). For example, the definition of "foreign representative" includes the
uniquely American role of the "debtor in possession" as defined within the United
States Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 6, at 326-27 (Official Comment, Explanation).
104. Id. § 7, at 324. Section seven provides that "(any treaty or convention gov-
erning matters of insolvency cooperation, which has been ratified by this country and
the country in which a foreign proceeding is pending, shall override this Act with re-
gard to such matters between such countries, unless the treaty or convention shall oth-
erwise provide." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 7, at 327 (Official Comment, Explanation). Many bankruptcy practition-
ers feel that international cooperation can be better pursued through a treaty approach.
Id. § 7, at 327 (Official Comment, Sources). For instance, Committee J of the Interna-
tional Bar Association argues that MIICA should be pursued concurrently with treaty
negotiations. Mears, supra note 2, at 30.
107. Mears, supra note 2, at 17.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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it does not establish guidelines for deciding which jurisdiction consti-
tutes the principal forum."' 0 Lastly, MIICA encourages recognition of
foreign proceedings where laws are substantially similar, but does not
provide a standard or procedure for testing the similarity of the laws."'
III. PROSPECTS FOR ENACTMENT
A. EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMNIUNITY
Although the process of adoption in each country will undoubtedly
be complicated, prospects for MIICA seem positive. Within the Euro-
pean Economic Community ("EEC"), MIICA could be enacted in one
of three ways. 1 2 The Council could issue a directive" 3 or a regula-
tion,"1 4 or the Member States could negotiate a Community Treaty re-
garding international bankruptcies.1 5
110. Westbrook, Global Insolvencies in a World of Nation States, 1. 18 (1990)
(unpublished manuscript on file at the offices of the American University Journal of
International Law and Policy).
111. Id.
112. Lafili and Hendrickx, Committee J, International Bar Association. Implemen-
tation of the Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) Within the
European Economic Community 1, 3 (Oct. 4, 1989) (on file at the offices of The Amer-
ican University Journal of International Law and Policy). For a general discussion of
current English, French, and German bankruptcy law, see Powers and Mears, supra
note 62, at 318-34; INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES, supra note
4, at 283-386.
113. Lafili and Hendrickx, supra note 112, at 3. According to Lafili and Hendricx,
such a directive may be legally based upon: (1) article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
1 (Cmd. 5179-1I) (official English translation) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]; (2) arti-
cle 1OA of the Treaty of Rome; (3) article 101 of the Treaty of Rome; or (4) articles
67 and 69 of the Treaty of Rome. Lafili and Hendrickx, supra note 112. at 3-5. Direc-
tives state an objective but allow national governments to decide how to pursue that
objective. T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 99
(1988). Directives bind only the people whom they address. Id.
114. Lafili and Hendrickx, supra note 112, at 6. A regulation issued by the Council
of the European Communities may be based upon article 235 of the Treaty of Rome.
Id. A regulation is binding at the Community and the national level. T.C. HARTLEY,
supra note 113, at 99 (1988). Because regulations are directly effective, Member
States do not need to promulgate national legislation to implement these regulations.
Id. at 197. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has stated that such imple-
menting measures are inappropriate. Id.
Some commentators argue that there is no substantial difference between directives
and regulations. Id. at 101. These commentators indicate that the European Court of
Justice has "'up-graded directives" so that they are similar to regulations. Id. This up-
grade ultimately grants rights to private citizens who seek to implement directives and
regulations against public authorities. Id.
115. Id. at 5. Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome allows Member States to "enter
into negotiations with each other with a view to securing. . .benefit[sJ." Treaty of
Rome, supra note 113, art. 220. A treaty regarding subject matter within the scope of
Community action may either be accepted as part of Community law or rejected as a
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According to members of Committee J of the International Bar As-
sociation, the directive approach provides the best means for enacting
common bankruptcy principles.' 16 The phrasing of the directive will de-
termine its effectiveness because an EEC directive has binding effect
only with regard to the results to be achieved, and not the method by
which to achieve those results. 117 A narrowly tailored directive would
grant less discretion to Member States in meeting MIICA's goals
through national insolvency legislation." 8 Because MIICA establishes
the methods for achieving international bankruptcy cooperation,
MIICA cannot be adopted in full."' Instead, a directive would include
only the principal concepts of MIICA.' 20 For example, a directive
would probably require the single administration of the estate, protec-
tion of the estate, and the equitable distribution of assets among both
domestic and foreign creditors in liquidation. 2' Additionally, the direc-
tive should include a time limit for implementation within each coun-
try'22 and a statement of reasons for the adoption of the MIICA
provisions.'2 3
usurpation of Community law. T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 113, at 92-95. Rejection is
based on the premise that certain subjects may be discussed at the Community level
but not at the State level. Id. at 95. "Where the Member States joined the Community
they transferred certain powers to the Community and the European Court has held
that Community power to conclude agreements with non-member States can automati-
cally exclude national jurisdiction to do so." Id.
116. Lafili and Hendrickx, supra note 112, at 6. A directive is the most "expedi-
ent" and "controllable" of the possible options. Id. See Mears, supra note 2, at 45 n.45
(noting that Timothy Powers, the Chairman of the International Bar Association Sub-
committee on International Cooperation, commented that MIICA may be considered
as an EC Council Directive). Mr. Powers believes that the EC's integrated statutory
structure provides "a unique opportunity for implementing MIICA in multiple jurisdic-
tions concurrently." Id.
117. Lafili and Hendrickx, supra note 112, at I1 (explaining article 189 of the
Treaty of Rome). A directive in the European Economic Community would "give only
guidelines for the implementation of such text into national law, therefore it is not at
all certain that after this stage of implementation, a real 'common legislation' of EEC
members will exist." Id. at 6. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 113, at 200 (explaining
that a "directive lays down an objective and leaves it to the Member States to achieve
that objective according to such means as they might think fit").
118. Lafili and Hendrickx, supra note 112, at 11-12.
119. Id. at 12.
120. Id. Although Member States may decide how to implement an EC directive,
those States are required to satisfy standards of "clarity and legal certainty and thus to
transpose the provisions of the directive into national provisions having binding force."
Id.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. at 13. Any legislation concerning MIICA will be rendered less effective if
Member States do not enact the provisions within a specific time limit. Id.
123. Id. The directive's implementation depends upon a detailed and specific state-
ment of reasons and arguments for the adoption of the directive. Id.
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B. CANADA
The Canada Report explains that for enactment in Canada, MIICA
must pass through ten provincial governments.124 This may be a diffi-
cult task, but the fact that MIICA legislates in broad terms rather
than in detail makes its passage more likely. 2 " The Canada Report
also discusses unresolved issues that MIICA does not sufficiently ad-
dress. These issues include: difficulties with reorganizations; treatment
and priority for local creditors; treatment of foreign revenue or penal
claims; degree of discretion allowed to local courts; dichotomy between
common law and civil law concepts; a bilateral treaty alternative; and
the effect of local adaptations and variations of MIICA. 126 The Canada
Report expresses concern with MIICA's provision that a court will rec-
ognize the foreign representative provided she complies with court or-
ders. 127 It is not clear when this recognition becomes final. The Cana-
dian members seek recognition of the foreign representative before the
termination of the estate in order to avoid the risk that non-compliance
of their foreign representative will adversely affect creditors. 128 More-
over, the Canada Report criticizes MIICA for using terms that refer to
American proceedings and have no real meaning in other countries.1 29
Finally, the Canadian Committee is skeptical of the provision allowing
a representative a full proceeding only if ancillary relief is unavailable
or denied.ls ° The Canada Report states that a foreign representative
should be able to pursue the full range of remedies. 131
124. See Committee J, Section on Business Law, International Bar Association,
Update on MIICA: The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act, Country
Committee Reports, tab 4, at 5 (Canadian Committee) (Oct. 4, 1989) (on file at the
offices of The American University Journal of International Law and Policy) [hereinaf-
ter Update on MIICA, Country Committee Reports] (stating that while in theory the
federal government of Canada may pass legislation without regard to the provinces, in
practice it rarely does). For a general discussion of current Canadian bankruptcy law
and treaty negotiation efforts, see Powers and Mears, supra note 62, at 313-18.
125. See Update on MIICA, Country Committee Reports, supra note 124, tab 4,
at 1 (Canadian Committe) (noting that international adoption of overly detailed legis-
lation is difficult).
126. Id., tab 4, at 4 (Canadian Committee).
127. MIICA, supra note 9, § I(a), at 323.
128. Update on MIICA, Country Committee Reports, supra note 124. tab 4. at 2-3
(Canadian Committee).
129. Id., tab 4, at 3. For instance, the Canadian members of Committee J empha-
size that "commencing a case" is a uniquely American term. Additionally, the mem-
bers suggest that "vesting" property be changed to "turned over" property in section
2(a) of MIICA. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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C. UNITED STATES
The United States Working Group of Committee J ("Working
Group") hopes that Congress will promulgate MIICA in the United
States." 2 The Working Group reports that because MIICA is based
largely on United States law, minimal revisions to existing law are nec-
essary. 13 13 Because current United States bankruptcy law does not con-
tain a provision that explicitly endorses universality, section one of
MIICA should supplement the Bankruptcy Code. 134 Congress should
add section seven of MIICA to extend the United States Code in order
to supply the treaty override provision that United States law does not
presently recognize.' 35 In addition, even though section 304 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code generally is considered the most "uni-
versalist" provision, section two of MIICA should replace it due to crit-
icism that section 304 provides the court with too much discretion. 30
Section 304 of Title 11 should also provide that the substantive law of
the foreign court applies in ancillary proceedings.' 3 7
Furthermore, section 303(b)(4) of the United States Bankruptcy
Code should clarify that a full proceeding is available only after the
foreign representative seeks and is denied ancillary relief, and that the
court applies local substantive law when a foreign representative com-
132. See U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at I (declaring that MIICA can be
incorporated into current United States law through minimal alterations to the Bank-
ruptcy Code and Rules).
133. See id. (noting that the United States Bankruptcy Code, the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure, and other statutory provisions already accomplish many of MIICA's
aims).
134. See id. at 7 (stating that section I obliges the local bankruptcy court to recog-
nize a foreign representative who respects the orders of the local court).
135. Id. Section 7 provides that any applicable treaty or convention overrides
MIICA. Id. The Working Group recommends incorporating sections one and seven of
MIICA into United States law by enacting a new section 110 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330. U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 7.
136. Id. at 8-9 (commenting that I I U.S.C. § 304(c) has been widely criticized as
providing the court too much flexibility in deciding whether to grant relief). See Leo-
nard, Carfagnini, and McLaren, supra note 36, at 30 (providing criticism of section
304(c) from the Canadian perspective). Section 2 of MIICA is preferable to section
304 because it lists the types of relief which a judge may grant in an ancillary proceed-
ing. MIICA, supra note 9, § 2, at 324. Section 2 also provides that an ancillary pro-
ceeding must be consolidated with any other related insolvency proceeding in that juris-
diction. Id. The United States Working Group comments that Bankruptcy Rule 1015,
regarding consolidation of actions, should be amended accordingly. U.S. Working
Group, supra note 28, at 9.
137. U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 8-9. Section 4 of MIICA states that
substantive foreign insolvency law applies unless "principles of international law and
conflict of laws" dictate that local substantive law be applied. MIICA, supra note 9, §
4(a), at 324.
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mences a full proceeding."'8 Because section five of MIICA closely par-
allels section 306 of the United States Bankruptcy Code regarding lim-
ited appearances of foreign representatives, United States law does not
need to be changed to incorporate MIICA.' 3 Lastly, section 101 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code requires minimal changes to achieve a
more precise definition of a foreign representative and a foreign
proceeding.1 40
The United States Working Group is actively seeking the enactment
of MIICA through several channels. 14' The Working Group has formu-
lated a plan of action for the next two years that strives to raise con-
sciousness about the defects in present United States bankruptcy law
and the benefits of enacting MIICA.4 2
D. OTHER COUNTRIES1 43
Preliminary reports from numerous other countries indicate a mixed
review of MIICA."I The reports from Australia,"8 Israel," 6 and Mex-
138. See U.S. Working Group, supra note 28, at 9 (proposing that these changes
incorporate the principle enunciated in MIICA sections 3 and 4).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 32. The Working Group presents the following agenda for enacting
MIICA:
The United States Working Group proposes to introduce MIICA for adoption by
the United States Congress through the foregoing 'proposed amendments' to ex-
isting bankruptcy law. The Working Group will identify and gain the support of
appropriate legislators to introduce bills in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate . . . Concurrently, the Working Group will seek to
build a consensus and generate a coalition of support for MIICA amongst vari-
ous 'opinion leaders' to whom Congress will look in deliberating over the pro-
posed amendments.
Id.
142. Id. at 32-35.
143. See INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES, supra note 4 (de-
tailing the current status of the bankruptcy laws of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Eg)pt,
England, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
the United States, and Venezuela).
144. See Committee J, International Bar Association, MIICA Update. I (Sept. 22,
1990) (on file at the offices of The American University Journal of International Law
and Policy) [hereinafter MIICA Update] (noting that one of the major obstacles to
encouraging international consideration of MIICA is obtaining translations of the pro-
posed act in various languages). Currently, MIICA has been translated into Danish,
Dutch, German, Japanese, Norwegian, and Spanish. Id. Translations into French and
Swedish are underway but have not been completed. Id.
145. See Id. at I (Australian Country Committee Report) (stating that the Austra-
lian Committee chair, David Bennett, reports that the principal legal officer to the
Inspector General in Bankruptcy supports implementing MIICA in Australian law).
The Australian Committee Report considers MIICA a "project of immense value." Id.
146. Update on MIICA, Country Committee Reports, supra note 124, tab 5, at I
(Isra.; Country Report) (commenting that the chances of Israel adopting MIICA are
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ico 14 7 expressed hope about the possibility of MIICA's passage,
whereas the reports from Brazil148 and Japan 49 portrayed the prospects
as bleak. Responses from other countries reporting to Committee J on
the implementation of MIICA were generally not extensive.1 50 Because
serious discussion of MIICA outside the major industrialized nations is
limited, MIICA's potential within those countries cannot be evaluated
yet.
good). While the Israeli members of Committee J are hopeful about the passage of
MIICA, they warn that European and American countries must lead the way before it
can become a viable alternative within Israel. Id. In addition, Israeli representatives
stipulated that because of Israel's unique position, Israel's enactment of MIICA must
include a provision that foreign substantive law applies for foreign proceedings in coun-
tries that "provide substantially similar treatment for Israeli insolvencies as for other
countries adopting MIICA." Id., tab 5, at 1-2.
147. See id., tab 2, at I (Mexico Country Report) (stating that international bank-
ruptcy cooperation is especially important for a country such as Mexico because in-
creased numbers of Mexican insolvencies and bankruptcies seem likely as a result of
Mexico's large private and public debt). Recent elections and pluralism in the Mexican
Congress have contributed to an uncertain political position that may delay adoption of
MIICA. Id., tab 2, at 6. The Mexican members of Committee J question why a foreign
representative may only commence a full proceeding if ancillary relief is unavailable or
denied. Id., tab 2, at 4. The members oppose imposing the burden of proving that the
ancillary relief was unavailable or denied on the foreign representative. Id. Addition-
ally, in Mexico the duties of a bankruptcy trustee are performed by a "sindico." Id.,
tab 2, at 2. Only national banking institutions, chambers of commerce, or chambers of
industry may assume the functions of a "sindico." Id, There is uncertainty as to
whether the term "foreign representative" adequately parallels the Mexican "sindico."
Id. The disparity in terms may require the term "sindico" to replace "foreign represen-
tative" in the Mexican adoption of MIICA. Id.
For a general discussion of current Mexican bankruptcy law, see Lic. Federico Mar-
tinez Montes de Oca, The Commercial Laws of the Republic of Mexico, V DIGEST OF
THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD 22-28 (1978); Romo, Questionnaire on Credi-
tors' Rights Against Business Debtors (Mexico), 1983 A.B.A. INST. ON INT'L WORK-
OUTS AND BANKR. 1-68; Powers and Mears, supra note 62, at 337-40.
148. See MIICA Update, supra note 144, at I (Brazil Country Committee Report)(noting that although the initial report from Brazil was encouraging, the most recent
report is not hopeful). The report states that Brazilian bankruptcy attorneys are neither
familiar with nor interested in MIICA. Id.
For a general discussion of current Brazilian bankruptcy law, see Baptista, Carvalho
Tess and Christino Netto, The Commercial Laws of Brazil, I DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF THE WORLD 31-33 (1983); Powers and Mears, supra note 62, at 309-13.
149. See Update on MIICA, Country Committee Reports, supra note 124, tab 7,
at I (Japan Country Report) (reporting that although Japanese enactment of MIICA
was initially promising, recent reforms of the Civil Procedure Code coupled with politi-
cal scandals and declining popularity of the Liberal Democratic Party make adoption
in the near future unlikely). For a general discussion of current Japanese bankruptcy
law, see Logan, Okamoto and Takashima, The Commercial Laws of Japan, IV DIGEST
OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD 21-25 (1982); Powers and Mears, supra note
62, at 335-37; Takeuchi and Butler, Creditors' Rights and Bankruptcy Law in Japan,
1983 A.B.A. INST. ON INT'L WORKOUTS AND BANKR. 52.
150. See Update on MIICA, Country Committee Reports, supra note 124 (includ-
ing brief reports from Israel, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Brazil, Mexico, the United
States and Spain); MIICA Update, supra note 144.
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IV. ALTERNATE FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY COOPERATION
Due to the criticisms of MIICA and the difficulties involved in enact-
ing it in any country, some bankruptcy practitioners advocate alternate
avenues for international cooperation. Other attempts at international
insolvency cooperation include the Scandinavian Convention,15' the
Bustamente Code of Private International Law, 5' the EEC Draft Con-
vention,153 and the United States-Canada Draft Treaty.", In addition,
one bankruptcy expert has proposed a series of bilateral treaties for
adoption by pairs of states.155 Presently, only the European Community
151. Scandinavian Convention, Nov. 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S. 136. Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have ratified the Scandinavian Convention. Gitlin
and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 309.
152. Bustamente Code of Private International Law, Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S.
362. This code, which contains a chapter on bankruptcy, has been ratified by fifteen
Latin American countries. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 309.
153. EEC Draft Convention, supra note 11. See Nadelmann, supra note 61, at
541-44 (discussing the development of the EEC Draft Convention).
The EEC Draft Convention balances a universality approach to international insol-
vencies against the need to retain differences in local law. The draft proposes the asser-
tion of original bankruptcy jurisdiction only in courts of the state where the debtor's
"center of administration" is located; governance of procedural and many substantive
matters by the law of the state where the bankruptcy case is pending; and the preserva-
tion of local substantive law when claims are made on assets within that state. Powers
and Mears, supra note 62, at 348. Mr. Powers and Ms. Mears criticize the EEC Draft
Convention on the following grounds: (1) lack of flexibility in conflict of laws rules: (2)
inadequate treatment of preventive proceedings such as reorganizations; (3) insufficient
protection of third party interests; (4) lack of accounting provisions for concurrent pro-
ceedings; and (5) failure to deal adequately with assets of a debtor located outside the
EEC. Id. at 348-49.
154. United States-Canada Draft Treaty, supra note II. Even though a 1970 Re-
port of the Canadian Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation
found that bankruptcy treaties would be useful, recent efforts at such a treaty have
illustrated that "[in the short term, a treaty is not likely to be a realistic solution to
cross-border bankruptcy problems." Leonard, Carfagnini and McLaren, supra note 36,
at 38. Cooperation between the United States and Canada is particularly important
because of the likelihood that cross-border business will increase as a result of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Id. at 25. The major obstacles that
stand in the way of a treaty are the differences in priority ranking in American and
Canadian law, the choice of laws, and the reluctance of the United States Congress to
relinquish autonomy in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 37 n.38. Cooperation between
the United States and Canada cannot be achieved until the problems of cross-border
insolvencies receive as much attention as other aspects of bilateral cooperation. Id. at
25. One criticism of the draft treaty is that it fails to recognize differences in the sub-
stantive bankruptcy law of the United States and Canada. As a result, the draft treaty
fails to acknowledge that the law of the nonadjudicating state should govern in certain
circumstances. Powers and Mears, supra note 62, at 347-48. For a general discussion
of the United States-Canadian Draft Treaty, see Nadelmann, supra note 61, at 550-55.
155. Westbrook, supra note 110, at 46-49. Peter Totty, a prominent insolvency
practitioner in London, suggests that national representatives draft a bilateral treaty,
which may be modified and agreed to by individual countries. Id. Mr. Totty argues
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Draft Convention is under serious consideration. 15 Although the enact-
ment of the EEC Convention or any other treaty may discourage sup-
port for MIICA, 15 section seven of MIICA clearly states that such an
agreement would override any MIICA provisions.' 58 Consequently, the
enactment of a Convention or Treaty should not curtail efforts to pro-
mulgate MIICA through domestic legislation. Although the more com-
mon approach to bankruptcy cooperation involves the development of
treaties, few multinational treaties are actually in force at this time.0'0
Furthermore, immediate prospects for treaty enactments are slim in
light of extensive criticism. 6 0
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The present draft of MIICA offers reciprocal treatment along with
adequate flexibility for the adopting jurisdictions. MIICA's goal is to
empower local courts to facilitate foreign proceedings"' and to be re-
sponsive to local creditors as well as to the policies reflected in local
insolvency laws.' 62 MIICA promotes worldwide efficiency in interna-
tional proceedings by centralizing the proceedings, treating creditors
equitably, and having a binding effect internationally. 63 Simultane-
ously, MIICA provides commercial actors with greater certainty re-
garding international bankruptcies and encourages international invest-
ment. MIICA is capable of diminishing current international
bankruptcy problems while the alternative solutions of treaties and con-
ventions continue to be pursued.
As a world leader in both commercial and legal developments, the
United States should pave the way for MIICA's enactment internation-
ally. The numerous country reports on the potential for MIICA's en-
actment are evidence that many countries are unsure of MIICA's bene-
fits. When nations still refuse to address bankruptcy problems because
of the stigma attached to this field, the United States must initiate dis-
that this alternative avoids choice of law problems because each individual pair of
states signing the bilateral treaty negotiates that issue. Id.
156. MIICA Update, supra note 144, at 2 (Scottish Country Committee Report).
157. See id. (noting that while the Council of Europe Convention on Bankruptcy
and the European Community Draft Convention are under consideration, the chances
of MIICA's adoption are slim).
158. MIICA, supra note 9, § 7, at 324.
159. See Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 311 (discussing various countries'
failure to ratify international bankruptcy treaties).
160. Powers and Mears, supra note 62, at 348-349.
161. MIICA, supra note 9, §§ l(b) and (c), at 323.
162. Id. at 324 (Official Comment, Statement of General Principles).
163. Mears, supra note 2, at 27.
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cussions. The United States has led the movement to establish bank-
ruptcy law as an accepted field rather than a marginal one. Now, the
United States should encourage other nations to recognize international
insolvency problems and attempt to solve them through domestic adop-
tion of MIICA's provisions.
The United States is in a unique position to initiate worldwide insol-
vency cooperation. Because MIICA is based primarily on American in-
solvency law, the United States Code needs few changes in order to
incorporate MIICA. Adopting MIICA in the United States will spur
other nations to adopt MIICA as well. For example, American corpo-
rations doing business in a foreign country will inquire whether that
foreign country has codified MIICA in domestic legislation. American
companies will be more willing to pursue business in countries that
have adopted MIICA. Consequently, foreign countries will have an
added incentive to enact MIICA.
Though enacting MIICA requires few changes in the Bankruptcy
Code, political obstacles remain. The United States Congress will enact
MIICA's provisions only when the American business community,
scholars, consumers, and attorneys address international bankruptcy is-
sues and pressure members of Congress to develop a more equitable
and efficient system. Thus, it is the task of all parties affected by the
inconsistencies and inefficiencies of international insolvencies to actively
lobby for congressional enactment of MIICA.
VI. CONCLUSION
An international bankruptcy occurs when the assets and creditors of
the bankrupt estate are located in more than one country. This type of
bankruptcy is likely to increase in number because of the recent growth
of international commerce.16 Differences in domestic laws of each
country in which assets and creditors are located can seriously affect
the orderly liquidation of assets or restructuring of the insolvent com-
pany.165 Thus, governments and individuals have been increasingly con-
cerned by the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in international
bankruptcy. 166 Although this interest in international bankruptcy has
led to different opinions on the best method for achieving international
cooperation, all alternatives strive for the most equitable and efficient
treatment of creditors. 67
164. Leonard, Carfagnini, and McLaren, supra note 36. at 26.
165. Id. at 23.
166. Id. at 27.
167. Unger, supra note 27, at 1154-55.
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Presently, no such uniform treatment exists. The incoherency evi-
denced in international insolvencies destroys the value of assets' 68 and
impedes the growth of international commerce.169 There is no indica-
tion that private international law has found a solution to this prob-
lem.17 Furthermore, inconsistencies between different countries cannot
be solved through independent actions within those countries. By defi-
nition, the lack of international cooperation must be approached
through the development of an international solution.171
Ideally, nations would develop a unified bankruptcy system providing
for equal treatment of all creditors in similar positions.7 2 In addition,
major trading nations would agree to establish international customs
and treaties to promote equity and efficiency. 7 3 Because such a prodig-
ious meeting of the minds seems unlikely, adoption of similar domestic
legislation within nations is easier to achieve and thus more immedi-
ately plausible. 74 Through the demonstration of a willingness to coop-
erate with other nations, one state may succeed in gaining the recipro-
cal cooperation of those other countries.1 75
168. Westbrook, supra note 110, at 3.
169. See Leonard, Carfagnini and McLaren, supra note 36, at 42 (arguing that
issues of international insolvency can be more easily resolved if focus shifts to the com-
mercial reality of reorganizations and failures of businesses with international
operations).
170. Harding, Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd.: A Canadian Approach to Some Specific
Problems in the Adjudication of International Insolvencies, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 412,
440 (1989).
171. Mears, supra note 2, at 26.
172. Gitlin and Flaschen, supra note 39, at 311.
173. Id. at 307-08.
174. Id. at 323.
175. Id. The authors argue that United States enactment of section 304 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 indicates such a willingness to cooperate with other
countries. Id.
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